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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1965, the Immigration and Nationality Act opened the United States to a wider variety 
of new immigrant populations. While the previous law (created in 1924) gave priority to 
applicants from the British Isles and Northern or Western Europe, the new law prioritized family 
reunification and work visas (Hero 2010). In the years that followed the 1965 Act, waves of new 
immigrant populations came to the United States as refugees and as voluntary immigrants. Not 
accounting for illegal immigration, in the past decade (2000-2009) over 10 million new 
immigrants gained permanent residence in the United States with 34% from Asia and 43% from 
the Americas (DHS 2012: 7-15). In 2005, the percentage of Latinos/Hispanics in the U.S. 
(14.5%) had surpassed Blacks (12.1%) (Hero 2010: 448). Such a large number of culturally 
diverse new immigrants raise questions regarding integration and public policy.  
Debates over immigration policy feature prominently on the public agenda. Some believe 
that new-immigrant minorities helped to decide the outcome of the 2012 Presidential election 
and the creation of immigration policy that people generally agree on will probably continue to 
be divisive, yet important. Zarate and Quezada (2012) suggest that  “prejudice towards 
immigrants is now 'allowed' by the new social norms and that such prejudice produces new 
questions rarely addressed in the literature” (160). Discerning what factors lead natives toward 
positive attitudes toward immigration and immigrants is important. Not only do these attitudes 
influence policy but also they alter the experience of new immigrants – often shaping their 
ability to integrate. Native attitudes towards immigrants and immigration are often entrenched in 
identities with researchers pointing to a high level of demographic factors influencing attitudes.  
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Religious affiliation and practice are also important factors influencing attitudes toward 
immigrants and immigration. On one hand, religious doctrines often preach charity and good 
will; on the other hand, new immigrant groups can appear as a threat to the religious identity of 
the members of religious groups. In recent years, many prominent religious leaders have openly 
called for more charitable treatment of immigrants in the United States, but the effect that these 
statements have on their religious communities is only beginning to be understood. Despite the 
rich body of literature on native attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, we do not 
robustly understand the effect of religion on these attitudes, nor has a thorough analysis of the 
effect of religious fundamentalism been conducted. Perhaps, certain aspects of religiosity will 
negatively influence attitudes toward immigrants and immigration while others will have a 
positive effect.  
Concretely, I expect that members of religious groups will be less likely to view 
immigrants negatively than the non-religious after religious fundamentalism is taken into 
account. I also expect that those who are only moderately active in religious activities will 
exhibit more prejudice than those that are highly active or not active. I also predict that those 
who are religiously fundamentalist will have the least positive views toward immigrants and 
immigration. These predictions are grounded in the literature on fundamentalism and political 
behavior, assumptions about the influence of the social beliefs of religious leaders, and the 
salience of religious practice in affecting social behavior and political action. 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Overall, researchers interested in explaining respondents’ attitudes towards immigration 
and immigrants (ATII) have had divergent empirical findings due to data set differences and 
conceptualization – however, they have generally agreed on theoretical concepts, especially that 
ATII are the result of individual characteristics or structural context. Researchers focused on the 
effects of individual characteristics have pointed to: socio-economic self-interest, symbolic 
interest, and contact theory; while those concerned with structural level factors have mostly used 
the group or competitive threat theory (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010: 317). 
Socio-economic self-interest is preserved by rationalizing and legitimizing native benefits 
and protecting those benefits from foreigners. Researchers have found that those who are less 
stable socio-economically tend to have more negative ATII due to the direct economic threat that 
immigrants are perceived to present (Burns and Gimpel 2000). Gustin and Ziebarth (2010) found 
that in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, the United States, and the United Kingdom, the 
2008 economic crisis increased negative feelings toward immigrants. This study suggests that the 
socio-economic threat perceived to be posed by immigrant populations was exacerbated by the 
international economic crisis. They argue that in the United States most of the negative sentiment 
toward immigrants has been placed on those that are illegal. However, in the U.S. there is a 
tendency to conflate legal immigrant with illegal immigrant. 
Symbolic interest theory suggests that an individual’s values or attachment to their group 
or individual identity has a significant effect on ATII. Those who feel a positive connection 
toward a group membership have been shown to display negative attitudes toward any perceived 
outside influence (Davidov et al. 2008). In regards to immigration, symbolic interest appears in 
the expression of nationalism, or religious particularism. For example, Chandler and Tsai (2001) 
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found that the belief that the English language is being threatened explains a significant amount 
of variation in ATII – with those who believe that English language is in danger holding negative 
views toward immigrants. In this case, nationalism is expressed through language use. 
Contact theory states that contact with minority or 'other' populations may foster 
favorable attitudes. Escandell and Ceobanu (2009) conceptualized contact with immigrants using 
variables measuring close relationship, occasional encounter or acquaintanceship, and workplace 
contact. They found that close relationship and occasional encounter or acquaintanceship 
reduced negative ATII over time but workplace contact did not. They also found that perceived 
group threat was a stronger predictor of negative ATII when controlling for other factors.  
Berg (2013) found that group threat in the form of symbolic racism is the most salient 
factor explaining ATII, especially in the form of limiting access to social services for 
immigrants. He found that negative attitudes toward immigrants were often supported and 
perhaps propagated by the majority group and drew on heavily stereotyped assumptions about 
the minority group. The clearest display of this theory is California’s Proposition 187, which 
attempted to prohibit illegal immigrants from using health care, public education, and other 
social services (Golden 1994). 
A few studies have analyzed the significance of these four major theories in conjunction. 
Yunus and Karakoc (2012) analyzed the salience of contact theory and group threat theory in the 
context of globalization. On an international scale, they analyzed whether increased globalization 
and immigration leads to a more positive views about immigration and immigrants though 
integration or whether it is perceived as a threat. They found that in general globalization in the 
form of high levels of openness to international trade and high levels of immigration leads to 
negative ATII.  
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A 2012 study conducted by Wallace and Figueroa also added globalization, among other 
variables, to an analysis of ATII. Using data from the United States, they found that group threat 
theory was supported by negative ATII in areas with sharp increases in immigrant populations 
and highly concentrated African-American populations. In contrast, they found that States with a 
high foreign-born population showed less prejudice – this finding supports contact theory, but 
contradicts group threat theory. Finally, the researchers analyzed cultural theory and found that 
cosmopolitan States with higher average educational attainment tended to have less negative 
views toward immigrants. These initial results led them to test their own explanatory theories for 
why certain states have higher ATII than others. They looked at economic competition, labor 
market deregulation, and globalization. In support of their economic competition hypothesis, 
they found that States with high economic growth tended to have lower levels of prejudice. 
Regarding market deregulation, they found that states with low union density, union de-
authorization, and low minimum wage tended to have higher levels of prejudice toward 
immigrants. Finally, they found that in regards to globalization, States that had recently 
experienced corporate restructuring had higher levels of prejudice. The results of this work and 
the work already mentioned suggest that the factors contributing to negative ATII are multi-
faceted. The empirical findings of these studies lent themselves to the creation of control 
variables in this study. 
Role of Religion in Attitudes toward Immigrant and Immigration 
 Philpott (2002) argued that the attacks of September 11th brought religion back into 
discussions of international relations. While it had been assumed that religion was not a driving 
factor in countries’ decisions, Philpott questioned whether this could still be assumed. His line of 
reasoning was that September 11th had heightened United States citizens awareness of the 
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religious ‘otherness’ of citizens of other countries and perhaps immigrants. This perception was 
probably enhanced by the ‘War on Terror’ and its media portrayal. Regardless of whether or not 
the events of September 11th marked a revival in the strength of religion based identities, the role 
that religion plays in affecting attitudes toward immigration and immigrants is an important one.   
McDaniel, Nooruddin and Shortle (2011) argued that religious affiliation can serve as a 
symbolic identity, usually attached to Christian nationalism, which leads to negative ATII. They 
argued that Evangelical or fundamentalist religious groups are especially prone to this view. As a 
majority group, Evangelical Christians may believe that Christianity is deeply tied to what it 
means to be American. This dates back to the early years of the United States, when America 
was described as a ‘city on a hill’ and it was believed that America had a special role in God’s 
plan.  
Daniels and von der Ruhr (2005) found that different religious denominations create 
different forms of social capital and are prone to different perceptions of group threat by 
outsiders. They argue that fundamentalists encourage a very bonding form of social capital 
which leads to strong in-group loyalty and overall antagonism to outsiders. Moderate and liberal 
Protestants tend to create networks which are more loosely bonded and less prone to threat.  
It has also been shown that those in minority religious groups (Jews, Mormons, and other 
non-Christian groups) are more likely to have positive ATII than mainstream groups (Knoll 
2009). Knoll called this the ‘minority marginalization’ hypothesis and suggested that the reason 
for this might be that members of minority religions feel a sense of shared experience with other 
marginalized groups.    
Contact theory would suggest that religious groups with greater numbers of immigrants 
in attendance (e.g. Catholics) might show less negative ATII. As mentioned above, Escandell 
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and Ceobanu (2009) found that close relationships and occasional encounter between natives and 
immigrants reduced animosity between the groups. An extension of this finding might be that in 
churches with diverse immigrant populations, native members would exhibit positive ATII. 
However, this theory has not been applied to religious communities. McDaniel et al. (2011) 
believe that positive ATII would not be seen in religious groups with more immigrant members 
because issues of religious identity are more salient. 
However, McDaniel et al. (2011) recognize that symbolic identity could be altered by 
church leadership. In the past decade many prominent religious leaders have made public 
statements articulating their beliefs about immigration and immigrants. These statements are 
important because they often communicate the role that they believe people affiliated with their 
religious group should take regarding immigrants and immigration. They have the potential to 
shape the meaning of religious identities. If the religious followers of these highly visible 
individuals are taking their messages to heart, ATII should have a significant relationship with 
religious affiliation. Among the prominent groups that have made positive public statements 
regarding immigrants and immigration are: Catholics, Baptists, other sectarian Christians, 
Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Lutherans, Methodists, Mormons, and Jews (Knoll 2009; Nteta and 
Wallsten 2012). The statements of these leaders often draw on the belief that the Bible 
encourages compassion and some have gone so far as claiming that resisting unjust laws is a 
moral imperative. However, at the same time, some leaders (usually Evangelicals) have made 
statements that emphasize the need to follow national laws and thus condemn immigrants and 
hope to deport those who have come illegally (McDaniel et al. 2011). These groups argue that 
the Bible supports the protection of national borders and the enforcement of national laws. In this 
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sense immigration, as Knoll (2009) argues, may be becoming a ‘moral’ issue for Christian 
communities. 
Nteta and Wallsten (2012) found that those that did hear messages in support of positive 
ATII at their local church were more likely to have a positive ATII. With this in mind religious 
participation is an important variable to include when analyzing the impact of religious 
affiliation on ATII. If a person attends religious activities more often, they may be more prone to 
hear the messages of their leaders which advocate extending charity to immigrants in the United 
States. Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello (2002) found that religious practice has a curvilinear 
relationship with prejudice - those with low or no church attendance and those with a high level 
of church attendance were found to be less prejudiced than those in the middle. Layman (1997) 
has gone further to argue that the distinction between more or less religious behavior and 
practice is just as important as denomination for understanding political behavior. Others have 
found that those who attend religious activities more often have deeper religious convictions and 
are more prone to follow the directives of their leaders (Lee 2002). Thus, a robust measure of 
religious practice is important to an analysis of religion and ATII. 
As stated above, I am particularly interested in the under-studied effect of religiosity on 
attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. With prominent religious leaders from a variety of 
religious groups making public statements in support of caring for immigrants, I would expect 
that the members of religious groups are more open to immigration and hold more positive views 
about immigrants than the non-religious. Further, I predict that those that frequently participate 
in religious activities (attend services and other activities) and those that never or almost never 
participate in religious activities are most likely to have a positive attitude towards immigrants. 
Finally, I predict that Christian fundamentalists will not have a positive attitude towards 
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immigrants and immigration - this might be explained by religious particularism and the 
subsequent feeling that other groups hurt the U.S and their religion by introducing new ideas. I 
predict that religious fundamentalism will have a greater effect on ATII than religious affiliation. 
With religious fundamentalism in the model, I predict that no religious group will be 
significantly more or less likely than the non-religious to have negative ATII. Overall, my 
predictions align with Scheepers et al’s (2002) view that there are some aspects of religiosity that 
negatively affect ATII and some that positively affect it. I have written my hypotheses below: 
H1:  Members of religious groups will be less likely to negatively view immigrants and 
immigration than those with no religious affiliation after accounting for religious 
fundamentalism and other factors. 
 
H2:  Those who participate in religious activities and services very often or seldom to not at all 
will be more likely to support immigration and think positively about immigrants, 
controlling for other factors. 
 
H3: Respondents who are religiously fundamentalist (believe the Bible is the word of God) will 
be less likely to think positively about immigrants or favor more immigration, controlling 
for other factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
10 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
METHODS 
I have used the 2010 General Social Survey (GSS) merged data for these analyses. The 
GSS is a nationally representative survey, conducted every two-years by the National Opinion 
Research Center in the United States. The survey has been conducted since 1972 and gathers 
data on social indicators. In 2006, the GSS switched from a repeating cross-section design, to a 
combined repeating cross-section and panel-component design. This particular data set includes 
all cases and variables from the 2010 GSS, including the variables and cases re-interviewed from 
previous years (N=4901). I will use this data set to run two analyses – one analysis with the first 
dependent variable measuring attitudes toward immigration (N=2679), and one analysis with the 
limited sample for the second dependent variable which measures attitudes toward immigrants 
(N=1310).  
Dependent Variables 
The first dependent variable that I used measures the respondent’s attitudes toward 
immigration. The question elicited their response to the following question: “Do you think the 
number of immigrants to America nowadays should be…increased a lot (1), increased a little (2), 
remain the same as it is (3), reduced a little (4), reduced a lot (5), can’t choose (8), or no answer 
(9)?” Due to frequency distributions and to simplify my analyses I collapsed categories so that 
my final variable separates only those who think immigration should increase (1, 2), those who 
think immigration should stay the same or don’t have a strong opinion (3, 8), and those who 
think immigration should decrease (4, 5). I set the “no answer” category to missing. With this 
variable a high value indicates a more negative view about immigration. 
 To operationalize attitudes toward immigrants I created a rounded composite score using 
three variables. The three variables asked for the respondents’ level of agreement with the 
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following statements: “Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in America,” 
“Immigrants are generally good for America's economy,” and “Immigrants increase crime rates.” 
Respondents could choose their answer from the following list: “agree strongly” (1), “agree” (2), 
“neither agree nor disagree” (3), “disagree” (4), “disagree strongly” (5), and “can’t choose” (8). I 
set all respondents who did not answer to missing. I then collapsed “neither agree nor disagree” 
responses with “can’t choose” because these seem to be expressing the same thing – the 
respondent does not have a strong feeling either way. I then reverse coded responses to 
“immigrants increase crime rates” and “immigrants take jobs away from people who were born 
in America.” I did this because I want a negative sentiment towards immigrants to be expressed 
by a high numeric value. In the regression analyses I collapsed the categories to be agree (1, 2), 
neither agree nor disagree (3, 8), and disagree (4, 5).  
Independent Variables 
 The GSS asked three questions that measure religious affiliation. First, respondents were 
asked “What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, 
or no religion?” If the respondent chose “Protestant” or “other,” they were then asked “What 
specific denomination is that, if any?” In the data set the first variable had a limited amount of 
response choices, whereas the second and third had a wide variety of specific denominational 
categories. I used these three variables to create a new variable which includes a more detailed 
and diverse selection of religious affiliations. This follows Sherkat’s (2001) claim that religious 
denominations structure religious life in the US and there are distinct and observable differences 
between them. The new variable includes: liberal Protestants (Presbyterians, United Church of 
Christ) (1), mainline Protestants (Episcopalians and Lutherans) (2), moderate Protestants 
(Methodists, Disciples of Christ, Brethren, Reformed) (3), Baptists (4), other Sectarian groups 
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(Assembly of God, Nazarene, Churches of Christ, Pentecostal Holiness, etc.) (5), minority 
religions (Jews, Mormons, and other non-Christian religions) (6), other Protestants (7), Catholics 
(8), and people with no religious identification (9). These categories were used as a dummy set in 
regression with the non-religious as the reference category. 
In order to measure religious fundamentalism, I used a variable that elicits the 
respondent’s views about the Bible. I have done this because fundamentalism is not necessary a 
primary identity and many people would not self-identify as fundamentalist because the label 
holds negative connotations. Hood, Hill, and Williamson (2005) describe fundamentalism as an 
‘intratextual’ belief-system meaning that a specific text is used by religious fundamentalists as a 
tool or rule book from which to interpret and evaluate all of life (e.g. Bible for Christians and 
Qu’ran for Muslims). For this reason, the respondent’s beliefs about the Bible are a good 
measure of Christian fundamentalism. The GSS asked: “which of these statements comes closest 
to describing your views about the Bible? – the Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken 
literally, word for word (1); the Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should 
be taken literally, word for word (2); the Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and 
moral precepts recorded by men (3).” There is also an option for “other” (4), which was not 
offered as a choice but volunteered by the respondent and “don’t know” – the total number of 
“other” and “don’t know” answers is very small. I collapsed both the “other” and “don’t know” 
categories with the belief that the Bible is a book of fables. I did this because I am most 
concerned with those that believe the Bible is the literal word of God (religious fundamentalists) 
and those that believe that it is the inspired word of God (religious moderates), as compared to 
those that are more liberal. I set the ‘no answer’ values to missing and created dummy variables 
for those that believe the Bible is the word of God, those that believe that it is the inspired word 
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of God, and those that think it is a book of fables or something else. Those that believe that the 
Bible is a book of fables or something else were set as the reference category in regression.     
In order to measure religious participation I created a rounded composite variable using 
two measures of religious participation: religious service attendance and participation in other 
activities. The first question asked “how often do you attend religious services?” Respondents 
could choose: “never” (0), “less than once a year” (1), “about once or twice a year” (2), “several 
times a year” (3), “about once a month” (4), “2-3 times a month” (5), “nearly every week” (6), 
“every week” (7), or “several times a week” (8). The second question asked, “how often do you 
take part in the activities and organizations of a church or place of worship other than attending 
services?” Responses were similarly classified into: “never” (1), “less than once a year” (2), 
“about once or twice a year” (3), “several times a year” (4), about once a month” (5), “2-3 times 
a month” (6), “nearly every week” (7), “every week” (8), “several times a week” (9), “once a 
day” (10), or “several times a day” (11). For both of these variables I set “don’t know” and “no 
answer” to missing. I then recoded the second question so that the scale is similar to the first. I 
started by reducing responses to the question of participation in religious activities, so that 
“never” was a value of 0 and “every week” a value of 7. I then collapsed responses 9-11 into a 
more general “several times a week” (8). After creating the mean composite variable, which 
ranges from 0-8, I created a dummy set including: never religiously active (0), about yearly 
religiously active (1-3), about monthly religiously active (4-5), and weekly religiously active (6-
8). In regression, I set the never religiously active category as the reference. I did this because of 
Scheepers et al.’s (2002) prediction that religious activity is curvilinear, as well as Ceobanu and 
Escandell’s (2010) assertions about the importance of understanding religious activity in models 
of religiosity. 
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Control Variables 
Immigration is not only a question of policy or identity; it is also a racially charged issue. 
Thus, it is important to control for race. For these analyses, I created a dummy variable set from 
a self-reported race question in the GSS. This includes white, Black, and other. There are two 
limitations with this choice: first, it does not catch the different experience or opinions of Asians 
or Latinos (two of the largest immigrant populations) and second, there are some issues with 
self-reporting. However, due to sample size limitations this is the best variable for understanding 
racial differences.  
 Immigration status is also an important control for understanding attitudes toward 
immigrants and immigration. To measure immigration status I used three variables. The first 
asked “were you born in this country?” The response categories are “yes” (1), “no” (2), and 
“don’t know” (8). I created a dummy variable with “yes” and “don’t know” (0), and “no” (1). I 
did this because I am interested in those who were not born in the United States and if someone 
does not know, this means that immigration status is not a salient identity for them. The second 
question asked, “were both your parents born in this country?” Respondents’ answers are 
categorized as follows: “both born in US” (0), “mother yes, father no” (1), “mother no, father 
yes” (2), “mother yes, father don’t know” (3), “mother no, father don’t know” (4), “mother don’t 
know, father yes” (5), “mother don’t know, father no” (6), “mother don’t know, father don’t 
know” (7), and “neither born in US” (8). Since I am interested in persons who know whether 
their parents were immigrants, I created a dummy variable for those with one or more parents 
born outside the U.S. (1, 2, 4, 6, 8) and compared them to those with either all parents born in the 
U.S. or who didn’t know about the birthplace of their parents (0, 3, 5, 7). The third question 
asked, “how many of your grandparents were born outside the US?” Respondents could choose 
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“none” (0), “one” (1), “two” (2), “three” (3), “four” (4), or “don’t know” (8). I created a dummy 
variable for those who knew their grandparents were immigrants by combining those with one or 
more (1,2,3,4) grandparents who were born outside the U.S. and comparing them to those with 
none or who didn’t know.  
 A variable measuring income is an important control for this model because of the 
competitive threat hypothesis mentioned above. I used the GSS variable that measures income in 
2006 dollar ranges. I did not alter this variable - it begins at “under $1,000” (1) and goes up to 
“$150,000 or over” (25). I also included a control variable for education which measures total 
education in years – starting at first grade (1) and ending at eight years beyond high school (20). 
Epenshade and Calhoun (1993), along with a number of other scholars have shown that an 
increase in education decreases prejudice. Other scholars have also shown that younger people 
are less prejudiced (Wilson 1996), and that women tend to be less prejudiced (Hughes and Tuch 
2003). Thus, I also included a variable that asked “how old are you?” and is measured in years, 
as well as a variable that measures sex. I dichotomized the variable measuring sex, so that male 
(1) and female (0).  
 Immigration is a very political issue, and so political affiliation is an important control 
variable. In the GSS survey respondents were given this prompt: “We hear a lot of talk these 
days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven point scale on which the 
political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal (1) to extremely 
conservative (7). Where would you place yourself on this scale?” This scale places moderates, or 
people who consider themselves “middle of the road” (4) politically, in the middle. Thus values 
1-3 are liberal persons and values 5-7 are conservatives. Since political affiliation is an important 
control for my model but not the focus of the analysis I collapsed all liberals together (1-3), 
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moderates (4), and conservatives (5-8). I set “don’t know” and “no answer” values to missing. I 
then created a dummy set with these three groups.  
 Regional differences are important to take into account when looking at religious 
differences, prejudice, and immigration policy. The GSS categorized respondents into detailed 
regional categories including: “New England” (1), “Middle Atlantic” (2), “East North Central” 
(3), “West North Central” (4), “South Atlantic” (5), “East South Central” (6), “West South 
Central” (7), “Mountain” (8), and “Pacific” (9). I used census classifications to collapse these 
groups into West, South, Northeast, and Midwest. However, the only major difference was 
between those in the South and everyone else, so I have only retained the Southern region as a 
dummy variable which includes “South Atlantic”, “East South Central” and “West South 
Central.”  
 To measure the effect of rural residence I used a variable that classified respondent’s 
place of residence by size and type. This variable included ten different sizes and types of 
location from a “city with a population greater than 250,000” (1) to “the open country” (10). I 
collapsed “smaller areas” (9) and “open country” to express rural location. I originally created a 
dummy set with all ten categories but the greatest differences were between people in the latter 
two rural categories and everyone else, thus I only used the single dummy variable.  
 Past researchers have found marital status to be an important control in studies about 
prejudice or immigration so I have included it in this model (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). In 
the GSS respondents were asked “are you currently…married (1), widowed (2), divorced (3), 
separated (4), or never married (5).” I created a dummy variable comparing those married (1) to 
everyone else (0), because this is what previous studies have found to be important (ibid).  
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Statistical Procedures 
  In my model I created two composite variables: one that measures attitudes toward 
immigrants and one that measures religious practice. To make sure that these were good 
measures I ran factor analysis and reliability tests for the first composite variable and correlations 
for the second using the full sample for the first dependent variable (N=2679). In order to do this 
I turned all potential variables into standardized measures (z-score variables). Using factor 
analysis, I examined the correlation between the following variables: the perceived effect of 
immigrants on crime, on jobs, and on the economy. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of 
sampling adequacy for this test was .67 and initial communalities for each item showed the 
proportion of variance explained by the factor to be above .5. The lowest of these was the 
perceived effect of immigrants on the economy, 57% of the variance in this item was explained 
by the factor. These variables all load strongly onto one factor with an Eigen value of 1.84 and 
this factor accounts for 61% of the total variance. In the reliability analysis for this factor, the 
Cronbach’s Alpha was .69 and this value would decrease if any single item were deleted from 
the factor (range of Chronbach’s Alpha’s if one item deleted: .52-.63). The corrected item-total 
correlation was highest for the variable measuring attitudes about immigrants and jobs (.55), 
followed by immigrants and crime (.48), and immigrants and the economy (.47). This analysis 
led me to create a composite variable measuring attitudes toward immigrants rather than a factor, 
so that I could talk about the results in a less abstract way. The second analysis examined the 
correlation between two standardized variables that measure the frequency of religious practice, 
these are: frequency of participation in religious activities and frequency of religious service 
attendance. In bivariate analysis these two variables were highly correlated (r=.66; p<.001).  
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 Bivariate relationships between my dependent variables and most of the independent 
variables were examined with cross-tabular analysis. I conducted Pearson correlation tests with 
three of the independent variables and the dependent variables because three of the variables are 
ordinal with more than five response categories. The variable measuring participation in 
religious activities did not have a significant Chi-square value in either of the bivariate 
relationships with the dependent variables. For this reason I proceeded to test whether there was 
a significant difference between the mean responses to attitudes about immigrants and 
immigration in this variable using one-way ANOVA. In the ANOVA tests for both dependent 
variables, the Levene statistic was not significant so I accepted the null hypothesis of equal 
variances and proceeded to check the F-test statistic. The F-test statistic was also not significant. 
This suggests that there is not a significant difference in mean scores to questions about 
immigrants and immigration across religious practice categories; nonetheless, I left the variable 
in the model for theoretical reasons.    
 Before running logistic regression, I checked my model for multicollinearity using 
ordinal least squares regression. None of the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were substantially 
greater than 2.5 in the collinearity statistics for the first regression (N=2679). I also checked for 
collinearity in the second model (N=1310) and had similar findings.  
 I estimated an ordinal regression using PLUM. Two multivariate models were analyzed: 
attitudes toward immigration (model 1) and attitudes toward immigrants (model 2). For each 
model, I entered the variables in steps. The first step includes the dependent variable and control 
variables only (race, immigration status, education, income, age, sex, political views, Southern 
residence, rural residence, and marital status). In the second step, I added religious affiliation 
dummy variables. In the third step, I added religious practice and in the final step I added belief 
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about the Bible1. In all four steps for model one, the model fit Chi-square values were significant 
and goodness of fit statistics were not significant, indicating a good fit. The test of parallel lines 
was violated in step one (p<.05) but not in any of the subsequent steps. For the second model, the 
model fit Chi-square values were also all significant and the goodness of fit values were all not 
significant. The parallel lines assumption was not violated in any of the steps. Again, this leads 
me to believe that these data fit the model.  
  
                                                 
1 These steps with be referred to as M1.a, M1.b, M1.c, M1.d for model one and M2.a…M2.d for model two.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
Univariate Statistics 
As mentioned earlier, the entire sample was not asked all of the questions that are of 
interest to these analyses. The questions that comprise my composite variable measuring 
attitudes toward immigrants had a smaller sample size (N=1310) compared to the variable 
measuring attitudes toward immigration (N=2679). I ran regression with the full sample for each 
dependent variable and then I ran a second regression measuring attitudes toward immigration 
and immigrants using the restricted sample for both variables (N=841). I present the univariate 
statistics for both samples below-starting with the full sample for attitudes toward immigration 
(model 1; N=2679), and proceeding to describe the second sample for attitudes toward 
immigrants (model 2; N=1310). The results of the limited sample for both variables (N=841) can 
be viewed in Table 1.  
**Table 1 Here** 
For model 1, the mean response to the question of whether immigration should be 
increased (1), decreased (3) or stay the same is 2.36 (SD=.7). This means that on average 
responses fell somewhere between hoping immigration would stay the same (2) or decrease (3). 
Regarding religious practice, 18% of the sample never participates in religious activities, 16% 
does so about yearly, 10% participate about monthly, and 9% participate weekly in religious 
activities. Thirty-two percent of the sample believes the Bible is the word of God, while 46% 
believe it is the inspired word of God, and 23% believe it is a book of fables or something else. 
Finally, 4% are liberal Protestants (Presbyterian, United Church of Christ, Unitarian), 6% are 
other mainline Protestants (Episcopalian and Lutheran), 9% are moderate Protestants 
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(Methodists, Disciples of Christ, Brethren, and Reformed groups), 17% are Baptists, 7% are 
from other sectarian Protestant groups (Assembly of God, Nazarene, Church of Christ, 
Pentecostal Holiness, etc.), 11% are from other Protestant groups not already mentioned, 23% 
are Catholic, 6% are part of a minority religion, and 18% have no religion.  
Demographically 14% of the sample is African-American, 78% is white, and 8% is of 
another race. Eleven-percent of the sample was not born in the U.S., 18% have one or more 
parents that were not born in the U.S., and 38% have one or more grandparents who was not 
born in the U.S. The average number of years of education completed is 13.74 (SD=2.96). The 
average income is somewhere between 30,000 and 39,9992 (M=16.97; SD=5.62). Forty-five 
percent of the sample is male and the average age is 48.59 (SD=16.73). Politically, 30% are 
liberal, 36% are moderate, and 34% are conservative. Twenty-two percent of the sample lives in 
the South and 12% live in a rural area. Lastly, 47% are married.  
 The sample used to test the dependent variable measuring attitudes toward immigrants is 
smaller (N=1310) than the one used for testing attitudes toward immigration (N=2679). The 
univariate statistics for this second sample were remarkably similar to the first sample; this can 
be observed in Table 1.  
Bivariate Statistics 
      I ran cross-tabular analyses to test the bivariate relationship between the dependent 
variables (measuring attitudes toward immigrants and immigration) and independent variables 
measuring: religious affiliation, religious practice, religious fundamentalism, race, immigration 
generation questions, political views, Southern residence, rural residence, and marital status. I 
                                                 
2 A score of 16 means that income is between 30,000 and 34,999 and a score of 17 means that the income is between 
35,000 and 39,999 in U.S. dollars. 
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ran a correlation with educational attainment, income, and age. These are all two tailed tests with 
the null hypothesis stating that the variables are independent of one another. Cross-tabular 
analysis using the dependent variable measuring the respondents’ beliefs about the rate of 
immigration did not result in a significant Pearson Chi-Square test for the variable measuring 
religious activity and the correlation between the dependent variable and income was not 
significant. The bivariate relationship between the second dependent variable (attitudes toward 
immigrants) was not significant for the level of religious activity and age. All other tests had 
significant results.  
Religious affiliation can result in conservative or liberal political and social beliefs, 
depending on the strength of commitment and the doctrines that are taught. This is an important 
variable for understanding attitudes toward immigrants and immigration because some 
prominent religious leaders have made public statements regarding the issue – usually supporting 
positive ATII. However, religious groups that are more conservative and do not have a strong 
social justice agenda may show a stronger preference for a decrease in immigration and hold 
negative views about immigrants. Bivariate analysis of the dependent variable measuring 
attitudes toward immigration and religious affiliation was statistically significant (X2=90.36; 
16df; p<.001). The relationship between the second dependent variable measuring attitudes 
toward immigrants and religious affiliation was also statistically significant (X2=86.28; 16df; 
p<.001). The detailed results are presented in Table 2 and Table 3. 
**Table 2 Here** 
**Table 3 Here** 
Correspondingly, the relationship between religious fundamentalism and attitudes about 
the rate of immigration (X2=29.02; 4df; p<.001) and immigrants (X2=55.50; 4df; p<.001) was 
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significant. Religious liberals were more likely to believe immigration should increase and more 
likely to have a positive view about immigrants than moderates and conservatives. Twelve 
percent of religious fundamentalists, 11% of moderates (AR=-2.8), and 17% of liberals 
(AR=3.7) believe that immigration should increase. On the other hand, 51% of religious 
fundamentalists believe that the rate of immigration should decrease compared to 51% of 
moderates and 40% of liberals (AR=-4.8). Fundamentalists were significantly less likely to have 
a positive view toward immigrants. Twenty-three percent of religious fundamentalists have a 
positive attitude about immigrants (AR=-5.5) compared to 34% of moderates and 48% of 
religious liberals (AR=5.7). On the other hand, 32% of religious fundamentalists have a negative 
view about immigrants (AR=4.9) compared to 21% of religious moderates and 16% of liberals 
(AR=-3.3). In both cases (attitudes toward immigrants and immigration) liberals were 
significantly less likely to have a negative view towards immigrants or believe immigration 
should decrease. These results suggest, fitting with my hypothesis, that fundamentalists are more 
likely to have a negative view about immigrants than those that are not fundamentalist. 
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Figure 1. Christian Fundamentalism and Attitude about Immigration 
 
Figure 2. Christian Fundamentalism and Attitudes about Immigrants 
 
Although immigration is often discussed in an abstract way it is a racial issue. This 
bivariate analysis confirmed that race and attitudes about immigration were significantly related 
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(X2=91.87; 4df; p<.001) and race and attitudes toward immigrants were significantly related 
(X2=28.84; 4df; p<.001). I imagined that a higher number of whites would support a decrease in 
immigration than Blacks or people of another race, and this was supported by the bivariate 
analysis. African-Americans were more likely to think that immigration should increase and less 
likely to believe it should decrease; however, regarding attitudes toward immigrants, Blacks 
were more likely than whites to have a neutral attitude and less likely to have a positive one.   
   Interpretations of the effect of race on attitudes toward immigrants may correspond 
slightly with immigration history. First generation immigrants were more likely to support an 
increase in immigration than natives (X2=108.80; 2df; p<.001). Those with at least one 
immigrant parent were more likely to support an increase in immigration than those with native 
parents (X2=93.39; 2df; p<.001). Lastly, respondents with at least one immigrant grandparent 
were more likely to support an increase in immigration rate than those with native grandparents 
(X2=28.48; 2df; p<.001). Similarly, 1st generation immigrants were more likely to have a positive 
view of immigrants than natives (X2=31.98; 2df; p<.001). Respondents with at least one 
immigrant parent were more likely to positively view immigrants than those with native parents 
(X2=53.52; 2df; p<.001) and those with at least one immigrant grandparent were more likely to 
have a positive attitude about immigrants than those with all native grandparents (X2=24.81; 2df; 
p<.001). Overall, respondents that are first generation immigrants, have at least one parent that 
was an immigrant, or have at least one grandparent that was an immigrant were much more 
likely to favor an increase in immigration and to think positively about immigrants than those 
who are native born, have native born parents, or have native born grandparents.  
The respondents' level of education was significantly correlated with their attitudes about 
immigration and immigrants - an increase in education leads to a decrease in the belief that 
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immigration should decrease and a decrease in negative views toward immigrants. A relatively 
equal number of men and women think immigration should increase and have a positive view of 
immigrants. Age was correlated with attitudes about immigration (r=.06; p<.005) but not 
attitudes about immigrants. Immigration is a politicized issue and attitudes toward immigration 
and immigrants were significantly correlated with political affiliation. Political liberals tend to 
favor an increase in immigration and tend to view immigrants positively, while political 
conservatives tend to favor a decrease in immigration and view immigrants negatively. People 
living in the South and in rural areas tend to favor a decrease in immigration and hold a negative 
view about immigrants. People who are married were significantly less likely to believe that 
immigration should increase, yet they were more likely to have a positive view toward 
immigrants. Finally, the respondents’ income is not correlated with attitudes toward immigration 
and has a negative relationship with attitudes toward immigrants. As income increases, negative 
views about immigrants decrease.  
Multivariate Statistics 
Model 1 (DV1 with full sample [N=2679]) 
 PLUM ordinal regression using the first dependent variable (whether or not the number 
of immigrants to the U.S. should increase, stay the same, or decrease), all independent variables 
and all control variables had a significant Chi-square value (X2=327.92; p<.001). As mentioned 
previously, the goodness-of-fit statistics (Pearson and Deviance) and test of parallel lines were 
not significant – further suggesting a good fit. I conducted this test in four steps which I will later 
refer to as 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d. The first step included all control variables, the second step added 
religious affiliation, the third step added religious participation, and the fourth step added 
religious fundamentalism. 
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***Table 4 Here*** 
 In this model, there was a significant relationship between several variables and the 
dependent variable. In the first step (1a), African-Americans and persons of another race were 
significantly less likely than whites to hold a negative view about immigration (p<.001; p<.05, 
respectively). First generation immigrants and those with at least one immigrant parent were also 
significantly less likely to hold the aforementioned belief, compared to those who were born in 
the U.S. or those with native parents (p<.001; p<.05, respectively). A one unit increase in 
education corresponds with a decrease in scores for the dependent variable (p<.001) and 
politically liberal respondents were significantly less likely than conservatives to have a negative 
view about immigration (p<.001). Compared to those that live in non-Southern or non-rural 
areas, Southerners and rural people were significantly more likely to hope to restrict immigration 
(p<.05).  
When religious affiliation variables were added (1b), the level of significance of the 
control variables was not altered. Compared to the non-religious, mainline Protestants, moderate 
Protestants, Baptists, Catholics, and other Protestant groups were significantly more likely to 
hold a negative view about immigration. In step three (1c), religious activity variables were not 
significant and the addition of these variables did not alter the coefficients of any of the variables 
already in the model.  
On the fourth step, when variables measuring the respondent’s level of religious 
fundamentalism were added, many of the coefficients changed. The variables measuring the 
respondents’ belief about the Bible were not significant on their own. Compared to those that 
believe the Bible is a book of fables or something else, the belief that the Bible is the inspired 
word of God approaches standard significance levels in increasing the odds of having a negative 
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view about immigration. The belief that the Bible is the word of God did not have a significant 
relationship with the dependent variable. Particularly, the addition of these variables in model 1d 
affected the coefficients of many of the religious affiliation groups. For example, in model 1c 
being Catholic rather than non-religious increased the odds of having a negative view about 
immigration by 32% (p<.05), in model 1d the coefficient for Catholics was insignificant. 
Compared to the non-religious, mainline Protestants, moderate Protestants, Baptists, and other 
Protestants were still significantly more likely in model 1d to hold a negative view about 
immigration but their coefficients decreased slightly. In model 1c, being part of a mainline 
Protestant group increased the odds of having a negative view about immigration by 58% 
(p<.05), while in model 1d it increased the odds by 48% (p<.05). Being moderate Protestant in 
model 1c increased the odds of having a negative view about immigration by 90% (p<.001), 
whereas in model 1d it increased the odds by 79% (p<.001). Being Baptist in model 1c increased 
the odds of having a negative view about immigration by 114% (p<.001), and in model 1d these 
odds were increased by 103% (p<.001). Lastly, in model 1c being in another Protestant group 
increased the odds of having a negative view about immigration by 49% (p<.05), and in model 
1d it increased these odds by 39% (p<.05). The control variables were not significantly affected 
by the addition of any of the religiosity variables – their significance and the direction of their 
coefficients remained the same as it was in model 1a.      
Model 2 (DV2 with full sample [N=1310]) 
 I next ran a PLUM analysis with the second dependent variable (a composite measure of 
attitudes toward immigrants), all independent variables, and all control variables. The model fit 
Chi-square value was significant (X2=222.6; p<.001) and the Pearson and Deviance values were 
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not significant meaning the model fit the data. The test of parallel lines also produced a Chi-
square value that wasn’t significant; meaning the assumption of parallel lines was not violated.  
**Table 5 Here** 
 I followed the same procedure with this dependent variable, adding the independent 
variables in four steps. In step one (2a), having an immigrant parent, having higher educational 
attainment, being politically liberal, not living in the South, living in a non-rural place, and being 
married all significantly lowered the probability that the respondent held a negative view about 
immigrants – all of these control variables except rural residence retained their significance 
throughout all four steps. In the second step, compared to the non-religious, being moderate 
Protestant, Baptist, and Catholic all increased the odds of having a negative view about 
immigrants. The coefficients of these religious affiliation variables were nearly unaltered by the 
addition of religious practice in step three (2c).  
In the fourth step (model 2d), the dummy set measuring beliefs about the Bible altered 
the coefficients for religious groups. Compared to the belief that the Bible is a book of fables, 
believing that the Bible is the word of God increases the odds of having a negative view about 
immigrants by 58% (p<.05). In the final model moderate Protestants and Baptists were 
significantly more likely than the non-religious to have a negative view about immigrants. In 
model 2c being a moderate Protestant increased the odds of having a negative view of 
immigrants by 97% (p<.05) and in model 2d these odds were increased by only 63% (p<.05). 
Being Baptist in model 2c increased the odds of having a negative view towards immigrants by 
164% (p<.001), and in model 2d the odds were increased by 114% (p<.001). While being 
Catholic approaches standard significance levels in increasing the odds of having a negative 
view about immigrants (39%; p<.1) in model 2c, in model 2d Catholic affiliation did not have a 
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significant relationship with attitudes about immigrants. Finally, although the coefficient for 
rural residence was significant in model 2a, 2b, and 2c, it was no longer significant in the final 
model.  
When I ran ordinal regression with the restricted sample for both dependent variables 
(N=841) the results were largely the same as the results described above. Being moderate 
Protestant, being Baptist, believing the Bible is the inspired word of God, being Black, being of 
another race, being a 1st generation immigrant, and educational attainment all had a significant 
relationship with attitudes about immigration. However, being mainline Protestant, part of 
another Protestant group, and having at least one immigrant parent were no longer significantly 
related to attitudes about immigration in the restricted sample. Compared to model 2 being 
Baptist, a Christian fundamentalist, a 1st generation immigrant, having at least one immigrant 
parent, and educational attainment were still significantly related to attitudes about immigrants in 
the restricted sample. However, being a moderate Protestant was no longer significantly related 
to attitudes about immigrants in the smaller model. Taking these results and the sample 
description statistics into account suggests that the samples were not drastically different in the 
three models.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION 
Understanding the relationships between personal characteristics, religiosity, and 
attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in the United States is important. As the U.S. 
becomes increasingly diverse new policies are needed to accommodate new residents and these 
new policies will need to have the support of the general public to be successful. In this study I 
have investigated the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward immigrants and 
immigration. I predicted that some religious groups, perhaps those with prominent leaders 
publicly asserting the importance of extending charity to immigrants, would be more likely to 
have positive views toward immigrants than those who are not religiously affiliated. I also 
predicted that religious activity would have a significant curvilinear relationship with attitudes 
toward immigrants and immigration. I believed that those who attended religious activities the 
most and those who attended the least would hold more favorable views about immigrants than 
those in the middle. Finally, I predicted that those who were religious fundamentalists would be 
significantly less likely than non-fundamentalists to have positive attitudes about immigrants and 
immigration.  
My first hypothesis was that members of religious groups would be significantly less 
prejudiced than people without a religious affiliation, after adding religious fundamentalism to 
the model. I drew from previous literature to make this hypothesis. Knoll (2009) argued that 
those in minority religious groups are less prejudiced and hold less negative views toward 
immigrants than the non-religious or other religious groups. Nteta and Wallsten (2012) found 
that those exposed to positive messages about immigrants in a religious setting were less likely 
to be prejudiced than those who had not been. Finally, McDaniel et al. (2011) argued that those 
in majority religious groups, such as Evangelicals, might have more negative views toward 
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immigrants due to the confluence of their religious and national identities. I believed that 
McDaniel et al.’s findings could be accounted for by fundamentalism not affiliation per se.    
I did not find support for this hypothesis. Unexpectedly, some religious groups were 
more likely than the non-religious to have a negative view about immigrants and immigration 
even after accounting for religious fundamentalism. Specifically, I did not find support for 
Knoll’s ‘minority hypothesis.’ While persons in a minority religious group are less likely than 
the non-religious to have negative views about immigrants and immigration, these are not 
significant results. Compared to the non-religious, I did not find that any religious group was 
significantly less likely than the non-religious to hold negative views toward immigrants and 
immigration. Nteta and Wallsten (2012) were able to more directly compare those who had heard 
messages in their local church that supported positive views toward immigrants and immigration 
and those that had not. This measurement difference may explain my divergent results. I did find 
that mainline Protestants, moderate Protestants, Baptists, and other Protestants were more likely 
to favor a decrease in immigration than the non-religious. I also found that moderate Protestants 
and Baptists were significantly more likely than the non-religious to have a negative view about 
immigrants. This fits with McDaniel et al’s (2011) claim that those in majority religious groups 
may have negative views toward immigrants and immigration because they are trying to protect 
their symbolic identity. However, other majority groups, such as liberal Protestants, were not 
significantly more likely than the non-religious to hold negative views toward immigrants and 
immigration. These results suggest that there is something about religious affiliation, other than 
fundamentalism and rate of participation, which leads some to negatively view immigrants and 
immigration. 
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My second hypothesis was that the respondent’s level of religious activity would be 
significant. I believed that, as Scheeper et al. (2002) found, the relationship would be curvilinear, 
with the highest level of prejudice coming from those moderately religiously active. The results 
of this analysis do not support this hypothesis. Religious activity was not a significant predictor 
of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration and it did not have a noticeable effect on the 
coefficients of the religious affiliation variables. This may be because this is not an issue of 
prejudice as I originally thought. Scheepers et al. (2002) were looking at the relationship between 
religious activity and prejudice. Layman (1997) made the more general claim that religious 
behavior or activity is as important as denomination for understanding political behavior. In 
these analyses, that did not seem to be the case. However, perhaps I did not include sufficient 
religious controls or my composite measure was not strong. 
My last hypothesis was that being fundamentalist would significantly increase the odds of 
having negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration and decrease the effect of any 
religious affiliation measures. This hypothesis drew from the findings of McDaniel et al. (2011) 
who argued that fundamentalist Christians are especially prone to hold Christian nationalist 
views which lead to negative attitudes toward immigrants. The addition of the variables 
measuring the respondent’s views about the Bible significantly altered many of the coefficients 
for religious affiliation. Regarding attitudes toward immigration, many of the religious affiliation 
coefficients dropped and the coefficient for Catholic affiliation was not significant after this 
addition. Even though these variables had an effect on the other variables in the model, they were 
not themselves significant. Belief that the Bible is the inspired word of God approaches standard 
significance levels in regards to attitudes about immigration, whereas belief that the Bible is the 
word of God does not. The addition of variables measuring fundamentalism to the model for the 
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second dependent variable also caused the coefficients of the religious affiliation variables to 
decrease. In this case, belief that the Bible is the word of God is also significant on its own 
(p<.05). These findings suggest that a measure of religious fundamentalism is an important 
addition to any study of the effects of religion, but does not explain all of the variation between 
religious groups. 
 Finally, previous research has argued that economic factors (Burns and Gimpel 2000), 
age (Wilson 1996), and gender (Hughes and Tuch 2003) were significantly related to prejudice. 
In this analysis these variables were consistently not significant. This may again be the result of 
immigration not being a direct issue of prejudice. 
These findings could be more robustly analyzed with a larger sample that was asked more 
questions directly related to immigration and religion. For example, Gustin and Ziebarth (2010) 
claim that much of the negative sentiment toward immigrants in the United States has been due 
to the conflation of legal immigrant with illegal immigrant. The questions available in the GSS 
do not differentiate in the interview between legal and illegal immigrants. In addition, many 
studies have included a control variable for Border States which I was not able to include. 
Furthermore, both the measure of religious practice and attitudes toward immigrants are limited 
and perhaps inaccurate. For example, it could be argued that the measure that I have used for 
attitudes toward immigrants actually only measures the perceived effect of immigrants on the 
United States – this may be a different measure altogether. Also, some religious communities 
may not emphasize religious activities other than religious services. Thus, a person might attend 
services once a week or more (8) but never participate in religious activities (0), this would make 
it appear as if they are moderately religiously active when in fact they are very active. 
Additionally, the variable measuring the respondent’s views about the Bible restricts the measure 
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to Christian fundamentalists and does not include fundamentalists from other religious groups. 
Lastly, the variation of participants within religious groups can be quite large. For example, there 
are extremely liberal Catholics and extremely conservative ones, and religious affiliation may be 
too broad a measure to catch the diversity within religious groups.  
The interactions between various religious groups and fundamentalism needs more 
detailed analyses than what I did in this study. It would be helpful to not only suggest that 
Christian fundamentalism has an effect but to also understand more concretely why it has an 
effect on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. This question began to be addressed by 
McDaniel et al. (2011) but could be explored further. Also, the interactions between various 
religious groups and basic demographic characteristics should be analyzed in more depth. 
Furthermore, the reasons why some religious categories remain significant after fundamentalism 
and religious activity are added to the model, remains a mystery. Research often assumes that 
groups like Baptists are prejudiced because the members are politically conservative or 
religiously fundamentalist, but both of these factors have been accounted for in this model. This 
important question may need to be addressed with qualitative exploratory research, followed by 
better informed quantitative work.  
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Table 1. Sample Description 
 
Dependent Variables (N=1310) (N=2679) (N=841) 
Attitudes Toward Immigration (1-3) --- 2.36 (.70) 2.37 (.67) 
Attitudes Toward Immigrants (1-3) 1.90 (.75) --- 1.94 (.75) 
Independent Variables    
Religious Affiliation    
Liberal Protestant .04 (.19) .04 (.20) .04 (.20) 
Mainline Protestants .06 (.24) .06 (.23) .05 (.23) 
Moderate Protestant .11 (.31) .09 (.29) .12 (.32) 
Baptist .16 (.37) .17 (.37) .16 (.37) 
Other Sectarian Group .07 (.26) .07 (.26) .07 (.26) 
Catholic .22 (.41) .23 (.42) .22 (.41) 
Other Protestant Group .10 (.30) .11 (.31) .10 (.30) 
Minority Religious Group .07 (.25) .06 (.23) .07 (.26) 
No Religious Identification .17 (.37) .18 (.38) .17 (.37) 
Christian Fundamentalism    
Word of God .31 (.46) .32 (.47) .31 (.46) 
Inspired Word of God .48 (.50) .46 (.50) .48 (.50) 
Book of Fables .21 (.41) .23 (.42) .21 (.41) 
Religious Participation    
Never .19 (.39) .18 (.39) .19 (.39) 
Yearly .13 (.34) .16 (.36) .14 (.35) 
Monthly .12 (.32) .10 (.30) .12 (.32) 
Weekly .09 (.29) .09 (.28) .09 (.29) 
Control Variables    
Race    
Black .14 (.34) .14 (.35) .14 (.35) 
White .78 (.41) .78 (.42) .79 (.41) 
Other .08 (.27) .08 (.27) .07 (.25) 
1st Generation Immigrant .11 (.31) .11 (.31) .10 (.30) 
Immigrant Parent .18 (.38) .18 (.39) .16 (.37) 
42 
 
 
 
Note. Mean scores are reported with standard deviation in parentheses
Table 1. Continued    
Immigrant Grandparent .36 (.48) .38 (.48) .36 (.48) 
Educational Attainment (0-20) 13.73 (2.91) 13.74 (2.96) 13.75 (2.81) 
Age 48.90 (16.56) 48.59 (16.73) 48.78 (16.47) 
Male .47 (.50) .45 (.50) .48 (.50) 
Income 17.23 (5.40) 16.97 (5.62) 17.20 (5.37) 
Political Views    
Conservative .35 (.48) .34 (.47) .33 (.47) 
Moderate .36 (.48) .36 (.48) .36 (.48) 
Liberal .29 (.46) .30 (.46) .32 (.47) 
Southern Region .22 (.41) .22 (.41) .24 (.42) 
Rural Area .12 (.33) .12 (.32) .14 (.34) 
Married .50 (.50) .47 (.50) .49 (.50) 
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Table 2. Cross-Tabulation: Attitudes toward Immigration and Religious Affiliation 
Note. Pearson Chi-Square: 86.28; 16df; p<.001 
a Immigration should be: increased, decreased, or stay the same. 
bRA refers to religious affiliation 
cAR refers to adjusted residual 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No
Religion
Count 18 11 19 35 31 31 32 80 82
% within RA
b 15.80% 7.20% 7.90% 7.90% 15.90% 19.90% 11.10% 13.10% 17.20%
AR
c 1 -2.1 -2.4 -3.3 1.4 2.8 -0.8 0.4 3.3
Count 52 57 85 137 72 68 105 250 211
% within RA 45.60% 37.50% 35.10% 30.90% 36.90% 43.60% 36.50% 40.80% 44.20%
AR 1.5 -0.3 -1.2 -3.7 -0.5 1.3 -0.8 1.2 2.7
Count 44 84 138 271 92 57 151 282 184
% within RA 38.60% 55.30% 57.00% 61.20% 47.20% 36.50% 52.40% 46.10% 38.60%
AR -2.2 1.7 2.7 5.8 -0.4 -3.1 1.4 -1.4 -4.9
Count 114 152 242 443 195 156 288 612 477
% within RA 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Decreased (3)
Total
Other 
Sectarian
Minority 
Religion
Other 
Protestant
Catholic
Increased (1)
a
Stay the Same 
(2)
Liberal 
Protestant
Mainline 
Protestant
Moderate 
Protestant
Baptist
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Table 3. Cross-Tabulation: Attitudes toward Immigrants and Religious Affiliation 
 
Note. Pearson Chi-Square: 90.36; 16df; p<.001 
a Respondent’s view about immigrants in the U.S. 
 
 
No
Religion
Count 25 34 38 32 31 40 44 96 96
% within RA
a 49.00% 41.00% 26.40% 15.20% 32.60% 46.00% 33.60% 33.20% 43.60%
AR 2.4 1.5 -1.9 -6.1 -0.1 2.6 0.1 0 3.6
Count 18 33 59 93 41 39 55 137 90
% within RA 35.30% 39.80% 41.00% 44.30% 43.20% 44.80% 42.00% 47.40% 40.90%
AR -1.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.4 0 0.3 -0.3 1.7 -0.7
Count 8 16 47 85 23 8 32 56 34
% within RA 15.70% 19.30% 32.60% 40.50% 24.20% 9.20% 24.40% 19.40% 15.50%
AR -1.4 -1 2.7 6.3 0.1 -3.3 0.2 -1.9 -3.1
Count 51 83 144 210 95 87 131 289 220
% within RA 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Negative (3)
Total
Other 
Sectarian
Minority 
Religion
Other 
Protestant
Catholic
Positive (1)
a
Neutral (2)
Liberal 
Protestant
Mainline 
Protestant
Moderate 
Protestant
Baptist
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Table 4. Ordinal Regression of Attitudes about Immigration (N=2679) 
 
 M1.a M1.b M1.c M1.d 
Religious Affiliation     
Liberal Protestant  -.16 (.20) -.17 (21) -.26 (.21) 
Mainline Protestant  .47 (.19)** .46 (.19)** .39 (.20)** 
Moderate Protestant  .65 (.16)*** .64 (.16)*** .58 (.17)*** 
Baptist  .77 (.14)*** .76 (.14)*** .71 (.15)*** 
Other Sectarian Group  .15 (.15) .13 (.17) .08 (.18) 
Catholic  .30 (.12)** .28 (.12)** .21 (.13) 
Other Protestant Group  .41 (.15)** .40 (.15)** .33 (.16)** 
Minority Religious Group  -.05 (.18) -.06 (.18) -.10 (.18) 
Christian Fundamentalism     
Word of God --- --- --- .04 (.13) 
Inspired --- ---- ---- .19 (.11)* 
Religious Participation     
Yearly --- --- .15 (.11) .15 (.11) 
Monthly --- --- .20 (.13) .20 (.13) 
Weekly --- --- .14 (.14) .15 (.13) 
Race     
Black -.66 (.11)*** -.81 (.12)*** -.82 (.12)*** -.80 (.12)*** 
Other -.44 (.16)** -.43 (.16) ** -.43 (.16)** -.42 (.16)** 
1st Generation Immigrant -.86 (.17)*** -.84 (.17)*** -.84 (.17)*** .84 (.17)*** 
Immigrant Parent -.36 (.15)** -.35 (.15)** -.35 (.15)** -.36 (.15)** 
Immigrant Grandparent .08 (.10) .15 (.10) .14 (.10) .15 (.10) 
Educational Attainment (0-20) -.09 (.01)*** -.08 (.02)*** -.08 (.02)*** -.08 (.02)*** 
Age .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
Male -.03 (.08) .00 (.08) .00 (.08) .00 (.08) 
Income .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) 
Political Views     
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Note. Regression coefficients are presented with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<.1; **p<.05;  ***p<.001.  
Reference variables are: religious affiliation - ‘no religious identification; Bible – ‘the Bible is a book of fables’; 
religious activity – ‘never religiously active’; race – ‘white’; political views – ‘political conservative’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4. Continued     
Moderate -.03 (.09) .01 (.09) .01 (.09) .00 (.10) 
Liberal -.48 (.10)*** -.39 (.10)*** -.40 (.10)*** -.40 (.10)*** 
Southern Region .29 (.10)** .22 (.10)** .22 (.10)** .22 (.10)** 
Rural Area .39 (.13)** .35 (.13)** .36 (.13)** .37 (.13)** 
Married .02 (.09) -.01 (.09) -.01 (.09) -.02 (.09) 
X2 269.68*** 319.63***  323.84*** 327.92*** 
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Table 5. Ordinal Regression of Attitudes about Immigrants (N=1310) 
 
 M1.a M1.b M1.c M1.d 
Religious Affiliation     
Liberal Protestant --- -.20 (.31) -.22 (.31) -.38 (.42) 
Mainline Protestant --- .05 (.26) .03 (.26) -.12 (.27) 
Moderate Protestant --- .68 (.22)** .68 (.22)** .49 (.24)** 
Baptist --- .96 (.20)*** .97 (.21)*** .76 (.23)*** 
Other Sectarian Group --- .10 (.25) .08 (.25) -.13 (.27) 
Catholic --- .34 (.18)* .33 (.18)* .20 (.20) 
Other Protestant Group --- .27 (.22) .29 (.22) .11 (.24) 
Minority Religious Group --- -.11 (.25) -.12 (.25) -.20 (.26) 
Christian Fundamentalism     
Word of God --- --- --- .46 (.20)** 
Inspired --- --- --- .23 (.17) 
Religious Participation     
Yearly --- --- .23 (.16) .26 (.16) 
Monthly --- --- .23 (.17) .20 (.17) 
Weekly --- --- .13 (.19) .09 (.19) 
Race     
Black .16 (.16) -.02 (.17) -.03 (.17) -.09 (.17) 
Other -.32 (.23) -.33 (.23) -.34 (.23) -.36 (.23) 
1st Generation Immigrant -.41 (.24)* -.39 (.24) -.39 (.24) -.40 (.24)* 
Immigrant Parent -.79 (.21)*** -.81 (.21)*** -.80 (.22)*** -.81 (.22)*** 
Immigrant Grandparent .03 (.14) .12 (.14) .12 (.14) .14 (.14) 
Educational Attainment (0-20) -.15 (.02)*** -.13 (.02)*** -.13 (.02)*** -.13 (.02)*** 
Age .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
Male -.08 (.11) -.07 (.11) -.08 (.11) -.04 (.11) 
Income -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01) 
Political Views     
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Note. Regression coefficients presented with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.001. 
Reference variables are: religious affiliation - ‘no religious identification; Bible – ‘the Bible is a book of fables’; 
religious activity – ‘never religiously active’; race – ‘white’; political views – ‘political conservative’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5. Continued     
Moderate -.09 (.13) -.07 (.13) -.28 (.17) -.07 (.13) 
Liberal -.50 (.14)*** -.39 (.14)** -.39 (.14)** -.34 (.14)** 
Southern Region .11 (.13) -.00 (.13) -.00 (.13) .01 (.13) 
Rural Area .40 (.16)** .35 (.17)** .36 (.17)** .31 (.21)* 
Married -.27 (.12)** -.42 (.14)** -.27 (.12)** -.29 (.12)** 
X2 173.07***  213.50*** 317.78**  216.90*** 222.60*** 
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Table 6. Ordinal Regression of Attitudes about Immigration and Immigrants (N=841)a 
 Attitudes about Immigration Attitudes about Immigrants 
Religious Affiliation   
Liberal Protestant -.36 (.40) -.32 (.40) 
Mainline Protestant -.18 (.36) -.11 (.36) 
Moderate Protestant .54 (.31)* .39 (.29) 
Baptist .53 (.29)* .68 (.28)** 
Other Sectarian Group -.23 (.34) -.22 (.33) 
Catholic .21 (.26) .34 (.25) 
Other Protestant Group .27 (.31) .24 (.30) 
Minority Religious Group .04 (.31) -.29 (.32) 
Christian Fundamentalism   
Word of God .26 (.25) .50 (.25)** 
Inspired .43 (.22)** .32 (.21) 
Religious Participation   
Yearly .12 (.21) .23 (.20) 
Monthly .39 (.23)* .28 (.22) 
Weekly .39 (.26) .14 (.25) 
Race   
Black -.78 (.22)*** -.20 (.22) 
Other -.53 (.31)* -.49 (.32) 
1st Generation Immigrant -1.11 (.31)*** -.53 (.32)* 
Immigrant Parent -.45 (.29) -.51 (.28)* 
Immigrant Grandparent .27 (.19) -.00 (.18) 
Educational Attainment (0-20) -.10 (.03)*** -.14 (.03)*** 
Age .00 (.01) .00 (.00) 
Male -.09 (.14) -.07 (.14) 
Income .02 (.02) -.02 (.02) 
Political Views   
Moderate -.03 (.18) -.27 (.17)* 
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Note. Regression coefficients presented with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.001. 
Reference variables are: religious affiliation - ‘no religious identification; Bible – ‘the Bible is a book of fables’; 
religious activity – ‘never religiously active’; race – ‘white’; political views – ‘political conservative’ 
a Limited sample for both variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 6. Continued   
Liberal -.33 (.18)* -.34 (.18)* 
Southern Region -.04 (.17) .06 (.17) 
Rural Area .50 (.23)** .29 (.21) 
Married -.21 (.16) -.37 (.15)** 
X2             131.09*** 149.59*** 
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